The figure shows the proportion of ... -strategists in two distinct populations ( ... and ... ) with the same number of individuals ... . At each time step, all individuals are randomly matched in pairs made up of one individual from population ... and one individual from population ... to play a symmetric 2×2 game. The two possible actions (or pure strategies) in the game are labeled ... and ... . Thus, each individual (regardless of the population to which it belongs) is either an ... -strategist or a ... -strategist. The payoffs of the game are ... , ... , ... , and ... (parameters), where, for instance, ... denotes the payoff obtained by an ... -strategist when he plays with a ... -strategist. At the end of each time step, after all individuals have played the game, one randomly selected player from each population revises her strategy— ... or ... —according to the following rule: "I look at another (randomly selected) individual in my population; if and only if she got a payoff higher than mine, I adopt her strategy". Thus, the game is played between individuals of different populations, but imitation takes place within each population.


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